Schriro v. Landrigan

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Schriro v. Landrigan
Argued January 9, 2007
Decided May 14, 2007
Full case nameDora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Petitioner v. Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan, aka Billy Patrick Wayne Hill
Docket no.05-1575
Citations550 U.S. 465 (more)
127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836
ArgumentOral argument
Opinion announcementOpinion announcement
Case history
Prior441 F. 3d 638 (CA9 2006)
Subsequent501 F. 3d 1147 (CA9 2007)
Holding
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Landrigan an evidentiary hearing. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy · David Souter
Clarence Thomas · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer · Samuel Alito
Case opinions
MajorityThomas, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Alito
DissentStevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
Laws applied
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007), was a United States Supreme Court case decided on May 14, 2007. In a 5–4 decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the District Court had not abused its discretion when it refused to grant an evidentiary hearing to convicted murderer Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan. In doing so, the Supreme Court also reversed the prior ruling to the contrary by the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which had held that Landrigan was entitled to habeas relief on the grounds that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The latter court had also held that the District Court's denial of such a hearing to Landrigan amounted to an "unreasonable determination of the facts", which is one of the two circumstances under which the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 permits the granting of federal habeas relief to state prisoners.[1][2] The Supreme Court's decision also found that a criminal defendant could waive the right for their lawyer to present mitigating evidence on their behalf, and that such a waiver did not have to be "knowing and intelligent" in order to be valid, even in a capital case.[3]

Background[edit]

Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan was convicted of second-degree murder in Oklahoma in 1982. In 1986, while in prison for that murder, Landrigan repeatedly stabbed another inmate, for which he was convicted of assault and battery with a deadly weapon. In 1989, he escaped from prison and murdered Chester Dean Dyer during a burglary. For this crime, Landrigan was convicted of theft, second-degree burglary, and felony murder. At his sentencing hearing for this conviction, Landrigan's lawyer attempted to present mitigating evidence, but Landrigan repeatedly interrupted him, and at Landrigan's request, multiple witnesses who had intended to testify on his behalf did not do so. The judge overseeing Landrigan's sentencing hearing subsequently sentenced him to death, and the Arizona Supreme Court unanimously affirmed his sentence and conviction.[2]

After Landrigan's subsequent attempts to seek postconviction relief in state court failed, he filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. The District Court refused to grant Landrigan an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision, but the full Ninth Circuit subsequently reheard the case en banc and reversed, holding that Landrigan was entitled to a hearing because, contrary to the District Court's conclusion, he had made a "colorable" claim that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel that fell below the standard outlined by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. The en banc Ninth Circuit stated that Landrigan's counsel had failed to adequately prepare for Landrigan's sentencing hearing, and that the Arizona postconviction court's conclusion that Landrigan had instructed his counsel not to present mitigating evidence was an "unreasonable determination of the facts" and thus grounds for habeas relief under AEDPA.[2]

References[edit]

  1. ^ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
  2. ^ a b c Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007)
  3. ^ Kellermeyer, Gregory; Wortzel, Hal S.; Martinez, Richard (2008-09-01). "Mitigating Evidence in a Death Penalty Case". Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online. 36 (3): 411–413. ISSN 1093-6793.

External links[edit]