R (Evans) v Attorney General
| R (Evans) v Attorney General | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Court | Supreme Court of the United Kingdom |
| Full case name | Regina (Evans) v Attorney General (Campaign for Freedom of Information intervening) |
| Decided | 26 March 2015 |
| Citation(s) | [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] 1 AC 1787[1] |
| Case history | |
| Appealed from | R (Evans) v Attorney General, 2014, Court of Appeal[2] |
| Related action(s) |
|
| Court membership | |
| Judges sitting | |
R (Evans) v Attorney General (Campaign for Freedom of Information intervening)[1] is a 2015 decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. It concerned a request for disclosure of communications passing between Charles, Prince of Wales and various government departments.
Procedural history[edit]
The case began with an application under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 by journalist Rob Evans. The government departments admitted that they had relevant letters, but "refused to disclose them on the ground that they considered the letters were exempt from disclosure under sections 37, 40 and/or 41". On appeal, the Upper Tribunal determined that "many of the letters, which they referred to as 'advocacy correspondence', should be disclosed".[1]: [3]
Rather than appealing the decision of the Upper Tribunal, the Attorney General issued a certificate under section 53(2) of the Freedom of Information Act, effectively overriding the decision of the Upper Tribunal. Evans sought judicial review of the Attorney General's decision to issue the certificate in the High Court.
A divisional court (Lord Judge LCJ, Davis LJ and Globe J) dismissed Evans' claim for judicial review. Evans successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal (Lord Dyson MR, Richards and Pitchford LJJ), which set aside the section 53(2) certificate. The Attorney General then appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal by 5–2 majority (Lord Wilson and Lord Hughes JJSC dissenting).
Commentary[edit]
Richard Ekins commented that the majority in Evans was "deliberately misinterpreting Parliament’s enactments to mean something that Parliament clearly did not intend" and called for Parliament to reverse the decision by amending the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to restore the ministerial veto.[5]
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^ a b c Regina (Evans) v Attorney General (Campaign for Freedom of Information intervening) [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] 1 AC 1787 (26 March 2015), Supreme Court.
- ^ R (Evans) v Attorney General [2014] EWCA Civ 254, [2014] QB 855 (12 March 2014), Court of Appeal.
- ^ R (Evans) v Attorney General [2013] EWHC 1960 (Admin), [2014] QB 855 (9 July 2013), High Court of Justice (Divisional Court).
- ^ Evans v Information Commissioner [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC) (18 September 2012), Upper Tribunal.
- ^ Ekins, Richard (2019). Protecting the Constitution: How and why Parliament should limit judicial power. London: Policy Exchange. ISBN 9781913459062.
  | This article relating to law in the United Kingdom, or its constituent jurisdictions, is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it. |