Abu Ali group

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The Abu Ali group, also known as the Tawhid group, was a jihadist group active in Essen, Germany. Formed in 2001, the group consisted of four Palestinians led by Mohammed Abu Dhess, also known as Abu Ali. The group was affiliated with Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad,[1][2] a terrorist group led by Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.[1][3]

Motivated by their hatred of Jews and Israelis,[1] the perpetrators planned to bomb a prominent Jewish community center in Berlin, as well as a nightclub and a bar in Düsseldorf. German authorities, who had been monitoring the group, arrested them on April 23, 2002.[1][3]

History[edit]

Early Logistics Operations[edit]

The Abu Ali's group early activities were predominantly logistical. The group gathered donations and transferred them to Afghanistan and Iran. They facilitated the smuggling of volunteers to join Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, including one of the cell's members, and forged and procured travel documents.[1]

Abu Ali's logisticals services became crucial when Zarqawi and his followers fled to Iran in October 2001. The group provided the Tawhid organization with dozens of forged passports, allowing many of Zarqawi's fighters to move to Arab countries.[1]

Initiation of investigation[edit]

In October 2001, the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) intercepted a phone conversation between Abu Ali in Essen and Zarqawi in Iran.[1] During the conversation, Abu Ali expressed his willingness to execute a terrorist attack and die as a martyr.[1][2] Zarqawi calmed Abu Ali and emphasized his importance as a trusted lieutenant in Germany.[1]

Abu Ali had been under surveillance before September 2001, but the potential danger he posed became evident only after the September 11 attacks. Following the phone conversation, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) informed the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), which intensified its investigation of Abu Ali's activities.[1]

Bombing Plot Development[edit]

Abu Ali traveled to Tehran on September 7, 2001, four days before the September 11 attacks, where he met Zarqawi and received orders to attack Jewish or Israeli targets in Germany. Upon his return to Essen, he informed his co-conspirators of an impending "wedding" (code for an attack) in Germany. Although Abu Ali confirmed his willingness to carry out the attack, he and his comrades soon realized they were being observed by German police. As a result, Abu Ali proposed to Zarqawi to delay the attack to avoid jeopardizing the plot. The other cell members continued their preparations.[1]

Shadi Abdallah, a young Palestinian who had spent nearly two years with al-Qaeda and Zarqawi in Afghanistan, was tasked with identifying possible targets and procuring weapons. Abdallah proposed targeting a Jewish community center in Berlin and a nightclub and bar in Düsseldorf, mistakenly believing they were frequented by Jews.[1]

Abdallah's main contact for procuring weapons was Djamel Moustafa, an Algerian passport forger. When the group was arrested, Abdallah had not managed to buy the necessary weapons. Zarqawi, growing impatient, frequently called the group members and pressured them to proceed with the attacks. After Zarqawi threatened Abdallah with consequences if he did not execute the attack in early April, German authorities intervened and arrested the conspirators.[1]

Arrest, legal proceedings and verdict[edit]

The group was arrested on April 23, 2002.[1] After court proceedings lasting over three years, four of the five plotters received jail sentences between five and eight years.[1] Shadi Abdallah, who served as a star witness, was sentenced to four years but was released in 2004.[1] His testimonies aided authorities in interpreting the evidence they possessed, since the recorded conversations contained coded terms such as 'apples', 'girls', and 'marriages'.[2]

The presiding judge emphasized the "special danger" posed by this group of "fanatic persons." Abu Ali group's members were primarily petty criminals rather than students, and they arrived in Germany during the 1990s, benefiting from the lax application of German asylum laws. The judge in the Abu Ali group trial criticized the German immigration authorities, emphasizing that both Abu Dhess and Shadi Abdallah should have been deported to Jordan long before the attacks were planned.[1]

Group Members[edit]

Mohammed Abu Dhess (Abu Ali)[edit]

The ringleader, born in 1964, hailed from a Palestinian refugee camp in Irbid, Jordan. He studied economics, performed as a singer, and played basketball for the Jordanian national team. After moving to Germany in 1992 and applying for asylum unsuccessfully, he returned to Jordan, turned to conservative Islam, and later re-entered Germany in 1995, posing as an Iraqi refugee. He lived in Essen, received social benefits, and started his career as a jihadist logistics official.[1] He had seventeen cell phones, but still, his conversations with Zarqawi were casual.[2]

Shadi Abdallah[edit]

Born in 1976, Abdallah was the drummer in Abu Ali's band in Irbid. He traveled to Germany with Abu Ali in 1995. Initially indulging in drugs and alcohol, he became more religious in 1998–1999 after coming into contact with Tablighi Jamaat. He joined al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,[1] undergoing training at the al-Farooq complex in Kandahar,[4] and subsequently joining Zarqawi's organization before returning to Germany to join Abu Ali's team.[1]

Ashraf Al Dagma[edit]

Born in Gaza in 1969, Dagma moved to Germany in 1994 after his asylum application was rejected. He dealt drugs in Berlin before becoming a pious Muslim and joining Abu Ali's cell. He traveled to Tehran with Abu Ali in September 2001 and received military training.[1]

Ismail Shalabi[edit]

A Jordanian citizen of Palestinian origin born in 1973, Shalabi grew up in Germany and the Palestinian territories. He was unemployed and worked occasional jobs. He was supposed to join Dagma on a trip to Afghanistan but opted out to care for his family.[1]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v Steinberg, Guido (2013). "Two Hamburg Cells: A History of Jihadist Terrorism in Germany". German Jihad: On the Internationalization of Islamist Terrorism. Columbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. pp. 44–48. ISBN 978-0-231-50053-1.
  2. ^ a b c d Sorrells, Niels C. (2008). "Taps and Terrorism: A German Approach?". Intelligence and National Security. 23 (2): 181–182. doi:10.1080/02684520801977295. ISSN 0268-4527.
  3. ^ a b Steinberg, G. (2008). The threat of jihadist terrorism in Germany. Elcano Newsletter, (50), 6.
  4. ^ Nesser, Petter (2008-04-09). "How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?". Terrorism and Political Violence. 20 (2): 239. doi:10.1080/09546550801920758. ISSN 0954-6553.